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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to explain the impact of the partnership on potato farms’ profits in 
Sembalun District, West Nusa Tenggara Province. To achieve this goal, we looked at 142 
farmers, comprising of 111 partnered farmers and 31 non-partnered farmers. The conclusions 
from our profit function analysis were: (i) the partnership had a positive impact on potato 
farmers’ profits in Sembalun District, West Nusa Tenggara Province; (ii) productivity, input 
costs, and labor costs had a significant influence on profits as an impact of the partneship. In 
this context, it is recomended that the local government encourage and facilitate potato farmers 
who have not yet established a partnership to enter such an arrangement with the company, so 
that their productivity and incomes increase. In addition, the local government is expected to 
build storage facilities for potato seeds. Future research should search for potato seeds that can 
replace the imported ones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 2 decades, economic liberali-
zation has led to rapidly increasing activity in 
the agro-industry of developing countries. How-
ever these new opportunities favour the large-
scale producers and marketers more than the 
smaller ones. Farmers with large areas of land, 
easy access to capital and market information 
find institutional support easily (Patrick, 2003: 
3). Conversely, farmers with little land do not 
find it easy, and even become marginalized and 
excluded from the marketing of high-value agri-
cultural and export oriented products, even 
though they can produce them (Drabenstott, 
1995: 14).  
This phenomenon indicates that the infor-
mation among the actors in the agricultural sec-
tor is not perfect (imperfect information), whe-
reas perfect information in neo-classic economic 
theory is a prerequisite for market equilibrium 
(Bates, 1995: 31; North, 1995: 17). Imperfec-
tions such as information are coupled with the 
uncertainty and high transaction costs that were 
assumed to be absent in neoclassic economic 
theory (North, 1995: 18). Therefore, in an effort 
to overcome these problems, the presence of in-
stitutions in such things as agricultural partner-
ships becomes very important (Grosh, 1994; Key 
and Runsten, 1999). White (1997) defines agri-
cultural partnerships (contract farming) as a way 
to organize agricultural production, where small 
farmers (outgrowers) are contracted by a com-
pany to supply agricultural crops in accordance 
with the terms specified in a contract or agree-
ment. 
The motivation for the actors in such part-
nerships (contract farming) is basically the same, 
namely to minimize risks and optimize profits. 
For companies, the motivation to partner pri-
marily is to avoid uncertainty in the supply of 
the raw materials they need, from the production 
and action of speculators in the free market. For 
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farmers, involvement in contract farming re-
duces the risk of uncertainty in the marketing of 
their products (Kirsten & Kurt Sartorius, 2002). 
In addition to securing a market, the farmers 
who participated in the partnership are provided 
with credit for production inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizer and pesticides by the partner companies 
who will be repaid after the harvest.  
Several empirical studies demonstrate the 
impact of partnerships in agriculture, these part-
nerships may increase the production and in-
come of farmers as a result of the use of new 
technologies, a reduction in transportation costs 
and in marketing costs. Warning and Key (2000) 
indicated in the results of their research in 
Sinegal that small farmers participating in a 
partnership involving peanut production re-
ceived higher incomes than those who did not 
participate. Similarly, Winter, et al. (2005) from 
the results of their studies on the evaluation of 
hybrid corn seed contracts between the farmers 
and an American multinational company in East 
Java concluded that partnerships have a signifi-
cant effect on the revenue of farmers, the alloca-
tion of labor utilization, and the cost of chemical 
inputs such as pesticides, herbicides, and ferti-
lizers. On the allocation of household resources 
usage and the use of chemical inputs, Singh 
(2002) from the results of his research in the 
Indian Punjabi agricultural sector concluded that 
the partnership had a positive impact on house-
hold resource use, in particular the allocation of 
household labor and the increasing intensity of 
the use of chemical inputs for agricultural pro-
duction.  
Empirical studies of the impact of agricul-
tural partnerships have also been carried out by 
Tatlidil and Akturk (2004) which focused on the 
comparative analysis between contracted and 
non-contracted farmers in the production of to-
matoes in Biga District, Canakkale Province, 
Turkey. The research found that: (i) the con-
tracted farmers use more inputs of seeds and 
chemical fertilizers than non-contracted farmers, 
(ii) their cost of production per unit of output is 
lower than that of non-contracted farmers, and 
(iii) the net profit of contracted farmers is 19 per 
cent higher than non-contracted farmers. The 
same conclusions have been found by Hamidi 
(2010), who focused his studies on the impact of 
partnership on the profits of Virginia tobacco 
farmers in Lombok Island. Hamidi found that: 
(i) the partnership had a positive impact on prof-
its, (ii) the level of productivity, the price of to-
bacco, the price of fertilizer inputs of NPK, 
KNO, pesticides, labor, kerosene, and interest 
rates all have a significant effect on profits as a 
result of the partnership.  
Meanwhile, empirical studies on the impact 
of partnerships on the profits of potato farmers 
using a profit function model are very limited. 
Previous studies focused more on the marketing 
aspects, as was done by Adiyoga, et al. (2006) 
who examined the integration of the potato mar-
ket in some major cities acting as consumption 
centers (Bandung, Jakarta, Medan, Singapore), 
the marketing of seed potatoes in West Java 
(Bachrein, 2004), and the pattern of distribution 
of potatoes in Bandung, West Java (Agustian 
and Mayrowani, 2008). It was on the basis of 
this existing limited research related to the 
impact of partnerships on the profits of potato 
farmers that this research was conducted. In 
addition to the above reason, potatoes became of 
concern to this study because they are a horti-
cultural commodity that has a very high growth 
demand. Data from the Ministry of Agriculture 
(2012) showed that the demand for potatoes rose 
from 572,342 tons in 1992 to 1,318,690 tons in 
2012. The increase in demand cannot be satis-
fied by domestic production, so potatoes must be 
imported. In 2005 the import of potatoes from 
the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands and Germany reached 2,864 tons, 
and increased to 4,069 tons in 2007. The District 
of Sembalun was nominated as a research loca-
tion because it had become one of the top 10 
potato producing regions in Indonesia, and the 
central production point for seed potatoes that 
are free from the disease Sis Yellow Nematode 
(PCN).  
The presence of PT. Indofood Fritolay 
Makmur to partner with the potato farmers in the 
district of Sembalun is expected to significantly 
increase the benefits for the potato growers. The 
problem is, is it true that such partnerships can 
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increase profits for farmers who run potato 
farms? If true, does productivity, the cost of 
capital input and labor costs affect the profits as 
a result of the partnership? Specifically, this 
study aims to (1) analyze the impact of these 
partnerships on the benefits for potato farmers in 
the district of Sembalun, West Nusa Tenggara 
Province; (2) analyze the effects of factor prod-
uctivity, capital input cost, and labor cost on 
profit as a result of the partnership.  
THEORY 
Partnership (contract farming) originated 
from the new institutional economic theory or 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE), that was 
created to overcome the problem of market fail-
ure caused by asymmetric information and other 
factors that affect transaction costs (Grosh, 1994; 
Key and Runsten, 1999). Market failure is men-
tioned by Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) in that 
agribusiness companies know more information 
about production technology and input-output 
markets than farmers do.  
In the analysis of the impact of partnerships 
in this study the Cobb-Douglas profit function 
was applied. Lau and Yotopoulos (1973) in 
Sadoulet (1995: 245), stated that the profit func-
tion can be derived by using the technique of 
Unit Output Price Cobb-Douglas Profit Function 
(UOP-CDPF), with the assumption that produc-
ers maximize profits more than satisfaction. 
UOP-CDPF is a function which involves the 
production and production factors that are nor-
malized by the output price. Mathematically, 
profit maximization can be derived from the 
production function and cost function as shown 
by Nicholson (1998: 377). 
For example, the production function for potato 
farming is:  
 ZXq     (1) 
with, q = output quantity 
 X = quantity of the variable input 
 Z = quantity of the fixed input 
   = intercept (constante) 
 α and β = elastisity of output from input X 
dan Z 
Cost function:  C )(q = wXvZ   (2) 
  v   : capital rent for fixed input 
     : price of variable input 
If and are prices of input and output, then profit 
function (π) becomes: 
)(),( qCPqZX   
              )(),( XZXPf                     (3)  
With,  π = profit 
          P = output price per unit 
If  =  /P is the normalized price of variable 
input, then the equation (3) can be normalized 
with output so that the output Price Profit (UOP 
Profit) is as follows: 
)(),( qCPqZXP   
                        )(),( X
P
ZXPf                 (4) 
The primary requirement for maximizing profit 
is that the first derivative of the profit function 
equals zero. 
XZXP     
01     ZXPX   (5)  
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Equation (8) indicates that the quantity of input 
that needs to be provided for profit maximizing 
depends on the output price, input prices, and 
fixed input Z. By substituting the equation (8) 
with (1) optimum output (q*) is gained as fol-
lows: 
 ZXq   



 Z
PZq










 1
1
 
2014 Hamidi 121 
 
 
     =   

  Z
PZ










  1
1
1
1
  
     = 














  




1
1
1 ZP
 
 
     = 








 11 1 1 ZP                 (9) 
The equation (9) shows that the optimum output 
quantity produced to obtain maximum profit 
depends on output price, input prices, and Z. The 
formula is: 
),,(** ZPXX                        (10) 
By substituting equations (8) and (9) into the 
profit function then maximum profit is: 
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The equation (11) shows that the maximum 
profit *)(  received by potato farmers depends 
on output price )( p , variable input prices )(w , 
and fixed input Z.   
METHODS  
Data Collection and Sampling Locations 
Collecting data for this study used a survey 
method with face to face interviews of potato 
farmers with guidance from a structured ques-
tionnaire. The study was conducted in the Dis-
trict of Sembalun, East Lombok, West Nusa 
Tenggara Province for 3 months, running from 
April to June of 2013, the selected study location 
was based on consideration of (i) it is the only 
location in NTB for potato development, (ii) the 
development is carried out through a partnership, 
and (iii) it has become a center for potato pro-
duction in Indonesia and the center for produc-
ing seed potatoes that are free from the disease 
Sis Yellow Nematode (PCN).  
Determination of the location of the village 
for our sample was by purposive sampling, giv-
ing consideration to the location of the develop-
ment, and the number of potato farmers. Based 
on data from the Office of Agriculture and Ani-
mal Husbandry, in 2012 the District of Semba-
lun became known as the location for the devel-
opment of the potato, which happened in 3 of the 
5 villages in Sembalun. They were Sembalun 
Lawang, Sembalun Bumbung and Sembalun 
Timba Gading villages.  
Sampling of Respondents 
The respondents in this study are potato far-
mers who are either partnered or not-partnered 
with PT. Indofood Fritolay Makmur. Determi-
nation of the number of samples of respondents 
in this study used the following formula 
(Sugiarto, et al., 2003: 60) 
))((1 2MoeN
Nn                        (12) 
with:  
n     =    number of samples 
N    =    population 
Moe =   margin of error  
Based on data from the Institute of Agricul-
ture and Animal Husbandry, in 2012 Sembalun 
District had a potato farming population of (N1) 
1,098 people who were in partnership, and non-
partnered farmers consisted of (N2) 310 people. 
By taking a margin of error of 10 per cent, then 
the sample size for partnered farmers (n1) is 111 
and for non-partnered farmers (n2) is 31 people. 
Then the selected sample farmers were distri-
buted to their respective village locations pro-
portionally. Furthermore, determining the res-
pondent farmers in each village used a simple 
random sampling method by way of lottery. 
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Variables and Data Analysis  
Data collected from the surveys, was then 
edited, tabulated, and analyzed. The analysis 
model used was the Cobb-Douglas Profit Func-
tion which includes 4 explanatory variables, i.e. 
productivity, capital input costs, labor costs, and 
a dummy variable of partnerships. Compared 
with other possible functions, the Cobb-Douglas 
function has the following advantages: (i) the 
solution is relatively easy compared to other 
functions, such as quadratic, and can be easily 
transferred to a linear form; (ii) the results of the 
estimation line through the Cobb-Douglas func-
tion produces regression coefficients which also 
identify the coefficient of elasticity; (iii) the 
elasticity shows the figure for the returns of 
scale. However, there are also limitations, 
primarily located in the estimation problems in-
volved in these least square methods, such as an 
error in the variable measurement, multi-colli-
nearity, and so on. Because of the primacy of the 
Cobb Douglas function then this study applied 
this analysis.  
The Empirical Model Profit Function of 
Cobb-Douglas in this analysis is shown by equ-
ation (13) as follows: 

  ii DZ                    (13) 
To facilitate the estimation of the equation 
(13) and also data on profit distribution (πi) and 
the determinants of profit nearing normal distri-
bution, then the equation is transformed into a 
linear form by making it logarithmic, so that the 
equation becomes: 
 iii v  lnlnlnln  
           iiDZ  ln   (14) 
πi = Profit (Rp) of potato farmers, partnered and 
not, and has been normalized with potato 
prices 
ϕ = Cross line of profit function 
νi = Productivity of potato farms, both part-
nered and non-partnered (kg/ha) 
ωi = Cost of capital input of partnered and non-
partnered potato farmers (Rp/ha) 
Zi = Cost of labor input of partnered and non-
partnered potato farmers (Rp/ha) 
Di = 1 for parnered farmers 
  0 for non-partnered farmers 
The empirical model equation (14) is hypothe-
sized as follows:  
(i)  The partnership had a positive impact on the 
productivity of potato farms, indicated by 
partnered/non-partnered.  
(ii)  Productivity (ν), the cost of capital input 
(ω), and the cost of labor input (affect potato 
farm profits). The hypothesis is accepted 
when the value of on partnered profit func-
tion value of on non partnered farmers at . 
(iii) Partnership had a positive impact on profit, 
based on the coefficient of the dummy 
variable of partnered farmers (δ > 0)  The 
hypothesis is accepted when the value of  
on the partnered dummy variable (Di) of the 
profit function of the partnered is more than 
the non-partnered farmers at . 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Potato Farming Partnership in Brief 
The partnership between PT. Indofood 
Fritolay Makmur and potato growers in the dis-
trict of Sembalun, West Nusa Tenggara Province 
started in 2005, at a time when the experiment 
was tried in a small area of 10 are (1 are = 100 
m2). The experiment showed positive results, so 
that in 2008 it was expanded to an area of 150 
hectares, with 968 farmers involved. In 2013 the 
number of potato farmers being partnered 
reached 1,098 belonging to the 3 village groups 
involved.  
In the operationalization of the potato 
farming partnership in the District of Sembalun, 
the rights and obligations of the farmers were 
not laid down in the form of a written contract, 
but on the basis of mutual trust, which was 
represented by the groups, rather than individual 
farmers. Farmers' rights in the partnership 
included receiving loans in the form of seeds, 
fertilizers, and pesticides, which were to be 
repaid after the harvest, while their duties 
included selling potatoes to the partner company 
at the specified price agreed upon previously. 
The number of seeds, and amounts of ferti-
lizer and pesticides provided to the farmers 

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depended on the area they planted with potatoes. 
For an area of 1 hectare the farmers were given 
2000 kgs of potato seeds, 3-4 tons of petrorganic 
fertilizer, 500 kgs of SP36, 500 kgs of NPK, 300 
kgs of ZA, and 100 kgs of KCl. Besides these 
products, they were also provided with a fungi-
cide (such as 2 liters of repus), 20 kgs of nemo-
spore, and insecticides like indomektilin (0.5 
liters), 25 grams of cirotex, and herbicides. The 
farmers do not actually harvest their crop 
themselves, this is the responsibility of the group 
which also bears the labor costs of Rp200-300 
per kg, depending on the farm’s position and the 
farm’s road. 
Empirical Model of Profit 
In economic theory, the level of profit re-
ceived depends on the amount of revenue and 
the production costs incurred. The results 
showed that the magnitude of the profit for po-
tato farmers who are partnered in farming is 
Rp26,904,063 per hectare or 14.48 per cent 
higher compared to non-partnered farms, who 
received Rp23,501,701 per hectare. The differ-
ence in the profit of partner farmers and non-
partner farmers is significant at = 0.01 with a     
p-value of 0.000 (Table 1). 
The higher profit of the partnered farmers is 
due to their higher revenues, i.e. Rp85,772,240 
per hectare or 12.03 per cent higher compared to 
non-partnered farmers who received 
Rp76,574,572 per hectare. Difference accep-
tance between partnered and non-partnered far-
mers is significant at = 0.01 with a p-value of 
0.000 (Table 1). The higher revenue of the part-
nered farmers is caused by their productivity and 
the selling price of potatoes, although the cost of 
the capital inputs of partnered farmers is slightly 
higher than the non-partnered farmers. 
The results showed that the productivity 
achieved is 22,270 kgs per hectare for partnered 
potato farmers or 9.06 per cent higher than the 
non-partnered farmers (at 20,419 kgs per hec-
tare). The difference in productivity between the 
two groups of farmers is significant at = 0.01 
with a p-value of 0.000. Similarly, the average 
selling price of potatoes that partnered farmers 
received was Rp3,850 per kg, while the non-
partnered farmers only received Rp3,750 per kg. 
The difference in the selling price per kg of 
potatoes between the 2 groups of farmers is also 
significant at = 0.01 with a p-value of 0.000 
(Table 1).  
In general, costs for partnered farmers to 
cultivate potatoes are higher than the non-part-
nered farmers. For the various types of capital 
input, costs incurred by the partnered farmers 
reached Rp37,743,572 per hectare, or 4.78 per 
cent higher than the non-partnered growers who 
paid Rp36,019,866 per hectare. The difference 
between these 2 capital input costs of the far-
mers groups is significant at = 0.01 with a         
p-value of 0.000. However, for the cost of labor 
inputs for both the partnered and non-partner 
farmers are relatively equal at Rp14,124,802 per 
hectare for the partnered farmers and 
Rp14,115,689 per hectare for the non-partnered 
farmers. Thus, the test for the differences in the 
averages of the 2 samples showed no significant 
difference between the 2 groups of farmers 
(Table 1). Furthermore, to test the hypothesis 
whether the partnership with the potato farmers 
had a positive impact on their profitability, a test 
of the profit function for partnered farmer 
groups, non-partnered farmer groups, and com-
bined groups in dummy variables was con-
ducted. Similarly, the testing for the influence of 
productivity, cost of capital input, and labor 
Table 1. Profit of potato farming per hectare in Sub Sembalun, 2013 
No Item 
Potato farmer 
t-stat p-value 
Partner Non-partner 
1 Profit (Rp/ha) 26,904,063 23,501,701 4.4473 0.000 
2 Revenue (Rp/ha) 85,772,240 76,574,572 12.1603 0.000 
3 Productivity (kg/ha) 22,270 20,419 9.3739 0.000 
4 Capital cost (Rp/ha) 37,743,752 36,019,866 10.1805 0.000 
5 Labor cost (Rp/ha) 14,124,802 14,115,689   0.0369        1.6659 
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costs against profits was made by using the 
regression model of the Cobb-Douglas Profit 
Function summarized in Table 2.  
The regression model for the potato farm 
profit function in Table 2 shows that the value of 
the coefficient of determination R2 is respec-
tively 0.594 for non-partnered farmers, 0.987 for 
partnered farmers, and 0.842 for the combined 
farmers. This means that about 59.4 per cent of 
the variation in profit for non-partner farmers, 
98.7 per cent of the variation in profit for part-
nered farmers, and 84.2 per cent of the variation 
in profit for the combined farmers can be ex-
plained by the explanatory variables of produc-
tivity of potato production, costs of capital input, 
and the cost of labor input. The rest of the 40.6 
per cent f = 1 per cent for non-partnered farmers, 
1.3 per cent for partnered potato growers, and 
15.8 per cent for the combined potato farmers 
can be explained by other factors. 
In the Cobb-Douglas production function of 
degree 1, the influence of other factors that are 
not incorporated into the model can be explained 
by the intercept, which is also an indicator of 
economic efficiency. Regression analysis 
showed that the intercept of the profit function 
of non-partner potato growers amounted to 
14.466 lower than the 16.010 of partnered far-
mers, with a significance at = 1 per cent. Even 
with the inclusion of a dummy variable, the in-
tercept value of partnerships increased to 21.162 
and was significant at = 1 per cent. According to 
Nicholson (1998: 291), the increasing value of 
the intercept indicates that the economic effi-
ciency of the production systems has increased. 
The increased economic efficiency which oc-
curred for partner farmers cannot be separated 
from the influence of the use of new technolo-
gies, technical developments, improvements in 
production systems, improved economies of 
scale, the economics of scope, and other benefits 
bought by the partner companies.  
Furthermore, the results of the regression 
analysis in Table 2 also show that the value of 
the F statistic for non-partnered farmers was 
17.565 lower than those who were partnered, at 
976.008. Both values are statistically significant 
at F = 1 per cent so it can be concluded that all 3 
explanatory variables included in the model, i.e. 
productivity, costs of capital input, and labor 
Table 2.  Estimates of Farm’s Potato Profit earned by Non-Partner Farmers, Partner Farmers, 
Combined Farmers, in Sembalun District, 2013 
No Explanating Variable 
Farmer Profit Function 
Non-Partner Partner Combined 
1 Intercept 14.466 
(2.556) 
16.010 
(3.236)* 
21.162 
(3.291)* 
2 Productivity(ln PRODTV) 0.676 
(6.115)* 
1.097 
(50.159)* 
1.206 
(16.370)* 
3 Cost of Capital Input (ln C) -0.264 
(-2.481) 
-0.107 
(-4.268)* 
-0.304 
(-3.790)* 
4 Cost of Labor Input (ln L) -0.333 
(-2.879) 
-0.277 
(-9.592)* 
-0.253 
(-4.725)* 
5 Dummy of Partnership (DUMMY) - - 0.182 
(1.859)** 
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.987 0.842
F 17.565* 976.008* 99.27*
Number of Observation 35 40 75 
Source. Analysis profit model from earned Non-Partner Farmers and Partner Farmers, Combined Farmers 
Figures in brackets show the statistics of t. 
** show statistical significance of = 10% 
*  show statistical significance of = 1% 
Dependent variable is ln profit ( /ha).  
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input costs incurred by partnered farmers, non-
partner farmers, and combined farmers jointly 
and significantly affect the potato farm’s profits 
in the district of Sembalun, West Nusa Teng-
gara. Even with the inclusion of dummy variable 
partnerships, the value of the F statistic for com-
bined farmers increased to 99.87 from the pre-
vious 17.565 and significant at = 1 per cent. This 
increase in the value of the F statistic was fol-
lowed by a growing number of significant 
explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, based on the results of the t-
test, it is known that not all explanatory variables 
have significant affects on potato farming prof-
its. For partnered farmers, all explanatory va-
riables significantly affect potato farming profits 
in the district. The variables include produc-
tivity, costs of capital input, and labor costs. For 
the non-partnered farmers, of the 3 explanatory 
variables included in the model, only 1 variable 
significantly affects the potato farm’s produc-
tivity (ln PRODTV), while the other two expla-
natory variables, namely the costs of capital 
input (ln C) and labor input (ln L) have no sig-
nificant affect. This happens because the usage 
and input prices as well as the amount of capital 
and labor among non-partner and partnered far-
mers are relatively equal. The impact of settle-
ments of farmers who are in a stretch of making 
the behavior of farmers in the use of capital and 
labor inputs are relatively the same, so even if 
the sample is enlarged, possible variations will 
not show any significance.  
The entry of the partnership dummy va-
riables into the model resulted in all explanatory 
variables, productivity (ln PRODTV), the cost of 
capital inputs (ln C) and labor inputs (ln L) 
becoming significant at = 1 per cent. In the 
explanatory variable productivity (ln PRODTV), 
both partnered and non-partnered farmers have a 
positive regression coefficient (as expected). For 
partnered farmers, productivity per unit of land 
area (hectares) has a significant affect on the 
increase in the farm’s profits. An additional 1 
per cent productivity can increase the profit by 
1,097 per cent and is significant at = 1 per cent. 
In the case of the non-partnered farmers, they 
experience a lower additional profit of only 
0.675 per cent when productivity increased by 1 
per cent. The entry of the partnership dummy 
variable into the model turns the coefficient 
explanatory variable of productivity to 1.206 and 
is significant at = 1 per cent. This means that the 
farmer’s participation in the potato farming part-
nership program is sensitive to an increase in 
profits as a result of increased productivity. An 
additional 1 per cent productivity can increase 
the profit to 1.206 per cent from 0.675 per cent 
previously. The higher share of the additional 
profits earned by the farmers is due to the prod-
uctivity of partnered farmers producing 22,270 
kgs per hectare, or 9.06 per cent higher than the 
non-partnered farmers (20,419 kgs per hectare).  
The higher productivity of the partnered 
farmers over the non-partnered farmers, in addi-
tion to their use of new technology, improve-
ments to the production system and the technical 
guidance of partner companies is also very likely 
due to better land used. One of the determinants 
of the productivity variable is the volume of the 
use of production inputs, which to a certain 
extent explains that when more inputs are used, 
the productivity will be higher. In this context, 
partnered farmers use more than the non-part-
nered ones. In the use of seeds, for example, 
partnered farmers used 2,264 kgs while the non-
partnered ones used 2,014 kgs per hectare. NPK 
fertilizer was used by the partnered farmers (567 
kgs), while non-partnered farmers only used 504 
kgs per hectare. Likewise with the other input 
types used, such as the SP36, ZA, Petroganic, 
pesticides, and herbicides. These significant af-
fects on the productivity of potato farming prof-
its as described above is in line with the results 
of research by Hamidi (2010), entitled “The im-
pact of partnership on profit of Virginia tobacco 
farming in Lombok Island”, that found that the 
inclusion of dummy variables into the model 
causes the coefficient explanatory variable of 
productivity to increase to 0.5777 from pre-
viously 0.1037 and significant at = 1 per cent.  
In the variable of the input cost of capital (ln 
C), both partnered and non-partnered farmers 
have a negative regression coefficient (as ex-
pected), but for non-partnered farmers it is not 
significant at = 1 per cent or 10 per cent . With 
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partnered farmers, an additional 1 per cent cost 
of capital input (ln C) can reduce their profit by 
0.107 per cent lower than that of non-partnered 
farmers, which is at 0.264 per cent. The lower 
proportion of the reduction of profits earned by 
the partnered farmer is due to the prices of inputs 
such as the fertilizer NPK which is lower at 
Rp2,500 per kg compared to Rp2,600 per kg for 
non-partnered farmers, SP36 price of Rp2,300 
per kg lower than the non-partnered farmers of 
Rp2,500 per kg. Similar to other inputs, such as 
the pesticide Delta, partnered farmers receive a 
price of Rp104,000 per liter, non-partner farmers 
receive Rp110,000 per liter. The entry of the 
partnership as dummy variable caused the varia-
ble of input cost of capital (ln C) significantly 
affect the profit at = 1 per cent, which previously 
was non-significant at = 1 per cent or 10 per 
cent. This means that farmers participating in the 
partnership program would reduce profit lower 
than non-partner farmers as a result of lower in-
put prices received. In the variable labor costs 
(ln L), the coefficient regression for both part-
nered and non-partnered farmers is negative (as 
expected), it was -0.333 for non-partnered far-
mers and -0.277 for the partnered farmers. This 
means that for every 1 per cent increase in labor 
costs, partnered farmers’ profits will decrease by 
0.277 per cent lower than non-partnered farmers 
at 0.333 per cent. The entry of the partnership 
dummy variable into the model caused the coef-
ficient of the explanatory variable of labor cost 
to rise to -0.253 from -0.333 earlier. This means 
that farmers participating in the partnership pro-
gram can reduce the decline in profit as a result 
of increased labor costs from the previous 0.333 
per cent to 0.253 per cent. The lower the percen-
tage decrease in profits that occurred in the part-
ner farmers due to the average wage paid per 
man-days (person-days) lower, i.e. Rp46,624 per 
person-day, while for non-partner farmers at 
Rp49,566 per person-day.  
The entry of the partnership dummy variable 
into the model function indicates that the com-
bined profit gained from potato farming in-
creased because of the institution of partner-
ships. This is shown by a positive coefficient of 
dummy variable of partnership of 0.182 and 
significant at = 10%. This means that the in-
volvement of the farmers in partnerships can 
increase their profits by 0.182 times. The 
increase in their profit happens because of the 
application of new technology, improvements in 
their production systems and technical guidance 
from the company, which improves the produc-
tivity of the potato farms and also increases the 
product price as well as decreasing the prices of 
inputs including fertilizers, pesticides, and herbi-
cides. 
The empirical examination above concluded 
that such a partnership has a positive impact of 
the profit of potato farmers in the District of 
Sembalun. The indicators are: (1) the intercept 
of the profit function of partnered farmers is 
higher than the non-partnered ones; (2) the 
coefficient of the dummy variable of partnership 
is positive and significant at = 10 per cent. These 
conclusions support the theory of NIE that states 
that partnership is an institution in agricultural 
sectors that can increase profits as a consequence 
of reduced transaction costs (North, 1995:18) so 
that cost per unit output reduces because the 
farmers receive lower priced inputs as transpor-
tation can be done in a collective way 
(Hennessy, 1996). These conclusion also support 
the results of previous research into partnerships 
that showed that farmers who participate in part-
nerships receive more income that those who do 
not (Glover, 1994; Little and Watts, 1994, 
Warning and Key, 2000; Tatlidil and Akturk, 
2004. Winters, et al., 2005; Hamidi, 2010). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIOS 
Conclusion  
This study aimed to explain whether partner-
ships have a positive or negative effect on profit 
for potato farmers in the District of Sembalun, 
West Nusa Tenggara. This research concluded 
that: 
1.  Partnership has a positive impact on the po-
tato farmer’s profits. This conclusion is 
drawn from (i) the intercept of the profit 
function in potato farming for partnered far-
mers which is higher than that of the non-
partnered farmers, (ii) the coefficient of the 
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dummy variable of partnership is positive and 
significant at = 10 per cent.  
2.  Productivity, cost of capital inputs, cost of 
labor inputs significantly affect the profit as a 
result of the partnership. 
Recommendations  
1. Partnership evidenced a profit increase for 
potato farmers. Thus, this study recommends 
government programs to push farmers to in-
crease their involvement in partnerships with 
the company, in order to increase produc-
tivity and profits and thus help reduce po-
verty rates in rural areas.  
2. One of the main problems in potato farming 
is the availability of seeds, which currently 
must be imported. Also cold storage facilities 
are needed for storing the seeds until they are 
distributed. Therefore, more research on 
seeds and their cold storage is suggested. The 
government, through the ministry of agricul-
ture, in collaboration with the agricultural 
office of West Nusa Tenggara, should build 
seed storage facilities, in the expectation that 
potato seeds become more readily available, 
cheaper and with certainty of supply, so that 
the profits from potato farming will increase. 
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